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The practice of securities holding, transfer and collateral has significantly changed 
over the past 200 years – moving from paper certificates and issuer registers to an 
intermediated environment, and from there to computerisation and globalisation. These 
changes made transacting more efficient and thus rendered markets more liquid. However, the 
law has lagged behind and is now itself an obstacle to efficiency because international securities 
transactions are subject to considerable legal uncertainty. The latest global market 
development, a cryptographic transfer process commonly called ‘the blockchain’, is the most 
recent efficiency-enhancing change. It offers a unique possibility to create a consistent legal 
framework for securities from scratch, on the basis of a legal concept that to some extent 
resembles bearer securities. This paper shows what the new international legal framework 




Harmonisation of commercial law  
 
I. Introduction 
In the fable The hare and the hedgehog, made popular by the Brothers Grimm in the 
19th century, the hare dies after running the same race 74 times, confident of its 
sprinting prowess, but quite failing to see that the race in which it was competing 
was fundamentally flawed. The fable springs to mind with respect to the repeated 
efforts to reform European and international securities law1 over the past 15 years. 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor for Financial Law and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political 
Science. I am grateful to Dan Awrey, Roy Goode, Hans Kuhn, Andrew Murray and the anonymous 
reviewer for their most helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. All remaining errors are my 
own. 
1 I will use the term ‘securities law’ throughout this article. It refers to those rules that are relevant for 
holding, acquiring and disposing of securities, including the definition of the nature of securities and 
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Two international Conventions, the Hague and the Geneva Securities 
Conventions,2 have been adopted but not implemented and an elaborate 
European Clearing and Settlement Legal Certainty project3 ended up tucked away 
in drawers after years of intensive work.  
 Since 2015, securities law has been back on the agenda, this time in the 
context of the European Capital Markets Union.4 The aim is to increase liquidity 
in the securities lending market. This means that it should become easier to 
convert securities into cash, and cash into securities, at will,5 thereby facilitating 
financing channels and ultimately the raising of funds for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The reform of securities law, including conflict of laws and property 
law, has been mentioned amongst such liquidity-enhancing measures. However, 
the caveat that this area is ‘political’ and ‘complex’6 suggests that the European 
Commission does not intend to follow the fate of the hare and will not run the 
same race again. This is an understandable stance. Attempts to reform securities 
law are locked into the complexities of market practice, idiosyncratic approaches 
in areas as sensitive as insolvency and property law, and, lastly, the wrangling for 
market shares between financial centres in Frankfurt and Paris, on the one hand, 
and the City and Wall Street, on the other hand. This is why fundamental reforms 
are very unlikely. 
 This is all the more true as the market is now already moving ahead in its 
constant search for more efficiency and liquidity, buoyed by the idea of using 
‘blockchain’ technology for securities transactions. As will be explained later, this 
newly emerging, internet-based concept for recording entitlements may lead to an 
environment in which securities exist only as pieces of electronic code stored on 
numerous internet servers, made resilient against fraud and error by using strong 
cryptographic processes (hence the term ‘crypto-securities’). In this environment, 
disposers and acquirers will be able to transfer securities directly amongst 
themselves, thereby eliminating the need to use intermediaries such as banks, 
brokers or custodians. Thus, blockchain is a prime example of disruptive 
technology in terms of market structure. Importantly, it may be equally disruptive 
in legal terms as the current legal framework may be unable to accommodate 
assets that are delocalised and not held and transferred through intermediaries. It 
is therefore time to think about the role that should be played by securities law and 
                                                                                                                            
covering questions such as how securities are treated in insolvency. In other words, securities law 
comprises elements of commercial, property, corporate and insolvency law. 
2 Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary 
(‘Hague Securities Convention’), www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72.  UNIDROIT 
Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities ('Geneva Securities Convention'); 
unidroit.org/english/conventions/2009intermediatedsecurities/main.htm.  
3 See, in particular, EU Clearing and Settlement Legal Certainty Group, Solutions to barriers related to post-
trading within the EU – Second Advice (2008), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/certainty/2ndadvice_final_en.pdf accessed 01.04.2016. 
4 European Commission, Green Paper – Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 final, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/capital-markets-union/docs/green-
paper_en.pdf, accessed  20.05.2016. 
5 For the purposes of this article I use this very basic definition of liquidity, as proposed by K Pistor, A 
Legal Theory of Finance (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315-330, 316. 
6 Green Paper (n 4), 2, 6, 23, 26; Commission Staff Working Document, Initial reflections on the 
obstacles to the development of deep and integrated EU capital markets, SWD(2015) 13 final, 15, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2015/EN/10102-2015-13-EN-F1-1-
ANNEX-1.PDF, last accessed 20.05.2016. 
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how the legal framework for crypto-securities transactions should be designed to 
support legal certainty and liquidity—which, from the legislator’s perspective, 
constitutes an immense challenge and an important opportunity at the same time. 
 This article traces why past developments aimed at supporting efficiency and 
liquidity in securities markets have been counterproductive in terms of legal 
certainty. Drawing on these findings, it identifies the main axioms of a future legal 
framework that will be legally consistent and safe and thereby support further 
liquidity gains, benefitting the economy and society as a whole.  
 Part II analyses how the interplay between market practice in search for more 
liquidity and the relevant substantive and conflict-of-laws rules has developed, 
moving from intangible loans to paper certificates and issuer registers, and from 
there to ‘intermediated’ holding, computerisation and globalisation. It shows how 
the law got locked into path dependencies so that today, liquidity levels are high—
but at the expense of legal certainty.  
 Part III discusses the opaque legal nature of securities in the intermediated 
environment. They mainly display the characteristics of relational rights (inter 
partes), whereas legal thinking and common perception are based on an 
understanding of absolute rights (erga omnes). As this friction leads to considerable 
legal uncertainty, regulatory compliance of intermediaries has become the linchpin 
of safe securities holding, acquisition and disposition.  
 Part IV builds on these findings. Blockchain securities show many of the 
characteristics of an erga omnes right and are therefore, in principle, easier to 
capture from a legal point of view. However, blockchain securities settlement does 
not require intermediation, thereby fundamentally challenging the current legal and 
regulatory approach, which consists of focussing the law and regulation on the 
intermediary function. Jurisdictions will therefore need to redefine the entire legal 
framework. This part sets out the main axioms of such a legal framework and 
addresses the need for legislators to act in a timely manner in order to avoid a new 
spiral of path dependency and temporary legal vacuum in the market. 
II. Three moves for liquidity 
In the early days of financing activity there were no ‘securities’ as such but merely 
mutual obligations, basically loans, between fund providers and fund receivers. 
Starting from this primitive state of financing, three different major developments 
can be identified where the economy’s need for increased liquidity has shaped 
market practice in relation to securities and, as a consequence, the law underlying 
it, eventually leading to the present situation where securities are transferred 
electronically and used as collateral on an international scale through a global 
network of intermediaries. The European Commission’s idea of reforming 
securities law with a view to facilitating financing channels in the economy is 
therefore by no means a novel one. Rather, it is the continuation of a development 
that started a long time ago. 
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A. Transferability, negotiation and novation 
Both shares and bonds consist, in substance, of payment obligations and, most 
visibly in the case of shares, certain participatory rights.7 All rights in these bundles 
are, by their very nature, obligations between the parties. For more than five 
hundred years, shares and bonds and their ancestors have been created and traded, 
first in Florence, later in Amsterdam and London.8 However, businesses have also 
in the past faced difficulties raising as much funding as they needed, while 
insufficient market liquidity was also a concern.  
 A major limitation was the unsatisfactory transferability of these investments. 
Potential investors knew that it might be difficult to find secondary acquirers 
should they decide to divest, since transferring a bundle of mutual personal 
obligations to a secondary acquirer was anything but fail-safe. Long before 
legislators intervened to enhance transferability and thus, liquidity, the market 
itself developed structures and mechanisms to allow potential investors to avoid 
an excess of what would today be called ‘due diligence’.9 Concepts emerged 
capable of enhancing trading in these instruments in a legal environment in which 
pricing was straightforward and transparent,10 and legally effective transfers easy 
to achieve. 
First, potential secondary acquirers were in an uncertain position as to the 
content of the relevant instrument, i.e. the exact legal and economic terms of these 
personalised instruments were difficult to assess. The market responded by 
increasingly standardising the object of the transfer in legal and economic terms. 
Thus, it became easier for secondary acquirers to assess the position they were 
interested in taking. Financial instruments were issued in batches of economically 
and legally identical units, up to the point where securities of the same issue 
became not only identical as regards their content but ‘fungible’, i.e. no longer 
identifiable on an individual basis. 
The second and third obstacles to transferability concern the process of 
transfer itself. It was difficult to ascertain whether the seller was empowered to 
dispose of the relevant rights and whether these were free of encumbrances. 
Further, assignment as a method of transfer was often unsatisfactory, in particular 
where only rights could be assigned but not obligations, at least not without the 
other party’s consent.11  
In this respect, the market developed two different concepts that are still in 
use today, notably transfer by delivery of a certificate, or transfer through register 
entries.  
Civil law jurisdictions used a—very fictitious—basic legal idea to explain why 
delivering a certificate to the acquirer transferred a bundle of obligations: the 
bundle of mutual obligations was coated with a property hull by ‘incorporating’ it 
                                                 
7 Also, bonds vest certain participatory rights in a bondholder, notably to participate and vote in the 
bondholders meeting. See A McKnight, The Law of International Finance, OUP 2008, 531; F Nizard, Les 
titres négociables, Economia et Banque Revue, Paris (2003), 17-20. 
8 JS Rogers, ‘Negotiability, Property and Identity’ (1990) 12 Cardozo Law Review, 470, 471-478. 
9 See Rogers, ibid. 
10 E Micheler, ‘The legal nature of securities’ in L Gullifer and J Payne (eds.), Intermediated Securities, 
Legal Problems and Practical Issues, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 145. 
11 See J Benjamin, Interests in Securities, Oxford University Press, 2000, 65-67; McKnight, (n 7), section 
12.9.1. 
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in a certificate, resulting in the paper being the security.12 Apart from the fact that 
the paper legally entitled its bearer to receive payments or to exercise participatory 
rights, the delivery mechanism of the certificate allowed for bona fide acquisition, 
protecting the acquirer from adverse claims.13 Professor Rogers argues that 
marketability of claims did not necessarily require the benefit of good faith 
acquisition;14 however, this is precisely what seems to have been the feeling at the 
time. In 1853, von Savigny described the market’s need to apply the advantages of 
the property transfer regime, in particular the possibility of acquiring in good faith, 
also to obligations.15 Other options would have been to hand, notably that of 
providing for the possibility of good faith acquisition of this particular type of 
claim immediately.16 However, legislators chose to take the property route, 
according to which delivery of the certificate transfers property in the certificate 
and thereby transfers the relevant rights.  
In England, bearer bonds are a form of documentary intangible and therefore 
embody the right; transfer occurs on the basis of delivery of the certificate.17 This 
had already been market practice for quite some time before the English courts 
recognised it in the 17th century18 and statutory law sanctioned it in the 19th 
century.19 Around the same time as Savigny’s proposal, in England the Bills of 
Exchange Act of 1882 recognised the mercantile practice of transferring 
obligations by endorsement (a scriptural act typically on the back of the certificate) 
and delivery to the acquirer.20 This act of ‘negotiation’ was understood not only to 
achieve the transfer of the rights but also to ascertain that the bona fide acquirer 
received them unencumbered.21  
The second option to address difficulties in the process of transfer is 
registered securities. The issuer’s shareholder or bondholder register ensures the 
integrity of the issue by excluding the creation of excess rights. At the same time, it 
is a good means of recording encumbrances and as such it protects any future 
acquirer. The institute of good faith acquisition in the proper sense is therefore 
unnecessary.22 In England, where registered securities are the rule, they are 
regarded as intangibles, or choses in action.23 Historically, choses in action constituted 
a personal obligation and could therefore not be transferred by assignment 
without the debtor’s consent,24 and in any case assignment was only able to 
                                                 
12 See Nizard, (n 7), 294.  
13 Rogers, (n 8), 479. 
14 Ibid; See also CW Mooney, ‘Property beyond negotiability’ (1990) 12 Cardozo Law Review, 305, 398-
99. 
15 FC von Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen römischen Rechts, Berlin, Veit & Comp., 1853, 97.  
16 Rogers, (n 8), 479.  
17 R Goode and E McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 4th ed., London (2010), 32. 
18 Shelden v Hentley, 2 Show. 161, cited after W Cranch, Reports of cases argued and adjudged in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Washington 1804, 389-390; Miller v Race, Court of King’s Bench 
(1758) 1 Burr 452 , 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758), edited online version by N Szabo, 
http://unenumerated.blogspot.be/2006/01/from-contracts-to-money.html, last accessed  20.05.2016. 
19 Rogers, (n 8); See also JS Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Notes and Bills, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, Ch 8. 
20 Benjamin, (n 11), para 3.21. 
21 Benjamin, (n 11), para 3.22. 
22 M Yates and G Montagu, The Law of Global Custody, 3rd ed. Tottel, Haywards Heath 2009, 20. 
23 Benjamin, (n 11) paras 2.05, 2.10. 
24 Micheler, Property in Securities – A comparative Study, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 21.  
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transfer the benefit, but not the burdens, of the contract.25 The solution to this 
problem came with the acceptance of novation, i.e. a tripartite contract between 
the alienator, the acquirer and the issuer. The issuer would typically manifest its 
consent by changing the register. Even though the statutory basis for transfer of 
securities by novation dates back to 1936 and 1985, novation was already the 
original basis in Common law.26 
B.  Intermediation and idiosyncratic laws 
Later, the industrialised world developed larger and deeper capital markets with 
higher trading volumes and more frequent transactions. The increasing degree of 
‘financialisation’ necessitated more liquidity in securities markets. Transfers on the 
basis of negotiation of paper certificates or changes wrought to issuers’ registers 
appeared too cumbersome, given the much higher frequency of transactions. 
Therefore, as the next step following improved transferability, the concept of 
securities intermediation through banks and brokers emerged, conceived to allow 
for more efficient outright transfer and encumbrance procedures. Again, the 
development was first driven by market practice, long before legislators sanctioned 
the new structures.27 Professors Mooney, Einsele, Benjamin, and Nizard were the first, 
for their respective jurisdictions, to analyse the legal consequences of that 
change.28 
1. Loss of the carrier, pooling and mirroring 
In the intermediated set-up, banks, brokers and other intermediaries administer 
securities holdings and effect transactions for their clients and for themselves 
through cascades of accounts set up amongst them. All accounts are ultimately 
linked to  a root account typically maintained by a specific kind of financial market 
infrastructure called central securities depository. There are typically one or more 
central securities depositories per jurisdiction; they also safe-keep the (paper-) 
securities certificates, if any. Investors receive, in both cases of bearer and 
registered securities, a credit entry in their securities accounts with their bank or 
broker.  
 This system obliterated the need to move physical security certificates (and in 
England: endorsement letters29) or change the issuer register whenever a change in 
ownership occurred or when securities were pledged or otherwise encumbered. 
The first central securities depositories for security certificates were founded in 
Vienna in 1878 and in Berlin in 1882, both probably modelled on the 18th century 
London Clearing House30 for cheques and bank notes. However, huge chunks of 
securities holdings still remained in separate bank custody or in private hands. It 
was not until the middle of the 20th century with the advent of computerisation 
that this practice, now referred to as central clearing and settlement, became 
                                                 
25 Benjamin, (n 11) para 3.18. 
26 Ibid, para 3.06. 
27 For instance, in Germany, securities intermediation was introduced in 1882, whereas the codification of 
the necessary legal changes occurred in 1937, see D Einsele, Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht, Mohr, Tübingen 
(1995), 12-13. 
28 Mooney (n 14); Einsele, (n 27); Benjamin, (n 11); Nizard (n 7). 
29 Benjamin, (n 11) para 3.06. 
30 Einsele, (n 27), 12; Huang, The law and regulation of central counterparties, Bloomsbury Publishing (2010) 44.  
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prevalent, and it has become the norm only recently.31 However, a number of 
jurisdictions, typically smaller markets or late market entrants, developed holding 
systems that did not entail intermediation and a cascade of accounts. In these 
‘transparent’ systems, all investors were directly linked to a central ledger.32  
 The practice of intermediation involves three practical characteristics that have 
fundamental legal significance. First, it disrupts the evidencing system that had 
hitherto been fundamental in explaining transferability. Notably, in respect of 
bearer securities, the security certificate lost its practical function and ceased to 
change hands, being kept in a central depository or even abolished altogether.33 
Thus, bearer securities, in their practical handling, are assimilated to registered 
securities. As regards registered securities, issuers’ books generally no longer 
reflect the investors’ names but the names of the intermediaries first in the 
cascade, typically a nominee company or the largest banks and brokers in a given 
jurisdiction. In both cases, the carrier of the right was deprived of its function and 
thus became a thing of the past. 
The second practical feature of the new holding pattern is that securities 
holdings are pooled, i.e. intermediaries hold their clients’ securities through an 
account with another intermediary in fungible bulks of identical securities, in so-
called omnibus accounts.34 For instance, if three investors have a specific kind of 
security credited to their accounts with their direct intermediary, that intermediary 
will hold the aggregate of these securities with a second intermediary in a bulk 
credited to one account. This account is in the first intermediary’ name, and the 
securities in it cannot be attributed to any specific investors. 
The third practical trait with legal significance is that the ‘same’ securities are 
mirrored in different accounts with different intermediaries throughout the 
cascade of accounts. This means that an investor holds its securities in an account 
with her direct intermediary, which holds its and other clients’ securities in a 
pooled account with a second intermediary, which holds all its clients’ securities in 
a pooled account with a third intermediary, etc., until the chain reaches an 
intermediary that has an account with the central securities depository or the issuer 
register.35 The length of such a ‘holding chain’ depends on the specific 
circumstances but may vary from just one intermediary to several. As a 
consequence, every individual security is mirrored in different pooled accounts 
maintained by the different intermediaries involved. The system-wide aggregate 
number of credit entries of a specific kind of security is therefore a multiple of the 
number of securities of that kind originally issued. A further complication is that 
securities accounts between investors and their intermediaries are structurally 
identical to the securities accounts that intermediaries set up between themselves. 
Therefore, the electronic credit entries in the accounts of investors are identical to 
                                                 
31 See Article 3.1 Regulation 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on 
improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and 
amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (‘CSDR’). 
32 Unidroit, Transparent Systems, Study 78 Doc 44, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2006/study78/s-78-044-e.pdf, last accessed 18.4.2016. 
33 France was the first financial centre to dematerialise securities in 1984. See also Article 3.1 CSDR, 
(n 31). 
34 L Gullifer, ‘Ownership of Securities’ in L Gullifer and J Payne (eds), Intermediated Securities, Hart 
Publishing Oxford and Portland (2010), 12-15; Rogers, (n 8), 485. 
35 Clearing and Settlement Legal Certainty Goup, (n 3) 30.   
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the electronic credit entries in the accounts of intermediaries. This obviously 
creates confusion as to whether these entries have a different content depending 
on whether they are made in favour of an investor or of an intermediary.  
2. The weakened position of the securities holder 
These three practical characteristics of intermediation (loss of carrier, pooling 
and mirroring) have significant consequences in legal terms, affecting the 
allocation of rights between investors and intermediaries.36  
Notably, the specificity and identifiability of individual assets have 
disappeared. The fact that the securities are only identified in kind leads to the loss 
of an important feature of traditional property or ownership rights and of security 
interests on which so many holding systems were based. As exchange-listed 
securities are typically fungible, they are subject to rules on commingling when 
they are pooled. As a consequence, the quality of the right may change, for 
instance from a property right to proportionate ownership in the pool, or it may 
even become a mere claim against the intermediary.37 The position of clients is 
weakened accordingly, especially in the event of the intermediary’s insolvency.38 
Further, this development placed under some strain the earlier achievement of 
easy and safe transferability, achieved through negotiability or good faith 
acquisition and the concept of the issuer register. These concepts had emerged 
earlier to facilitate transfer; however, with the advent of intermediation they have 
actually become fundamental as acquirers in this anonymous environment de facto 
have no possibility of checking who the disposer is and therefore whether it has 
the right to dispose of the securities. However, how could this system possibly 
work in an environment where both certificates and issuer registers have lost their 
functions, and where there are electronic account entries that all look alike but 
have different contents?  
In other words, with the advent of intermediation, the factual elements that 
earlier paved the legal grounds for safe and easy acquisition were wiped out for the 
sake of the operational benefits of intermediation. This crack in the edifice 
considerably endangered what is today referred to as ‘client asset protection’ and, 
to be realistic, has not been entirely papered over so far. 
3. National idiosyncrasies 
In attempting to solve this problem, countries have relied on idiosyncratic 
approaches, thereby abandoning the homogeneity that had existed between them 
as long as the market was organised on the basis of paper certificates and issuer 
registers.  
 Some countries took bold steps and adapted the law to the practice (in 
particular the US,39 with Canada40 following its model), while others adapted the 
                                                 
36 See Mooney (n 14), 225-28. 
37 Rogers (n 8), 485. New legislation aims at reducing commingling and the use of omnibus accounts, see 
CSDR (n 33), Article 38.  
38 L Gullifer (n 34), 4. 
39 See JS Rogers, ‘Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Art. 8’ (1995-96) 43 UCLA L. Rev., 1449-59. 
40 See Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Securities Transfer Act, accessible 
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/530-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/securities-transfer-act/1124-
securities-transfer-act?showall=&limitstart=, last accessed 20.05.2016. 
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practice to the law (in particular the Nordic countries41 and China42). Some 
continued somehow to hover, confusingly, between these two approaches 
(France,43 Germany44), while England45 changed nothing at all in legal terms. 
What can be observed in various countries is a paradigmatic path-dependent 
development, where legal tradition coupled with existing market infrastructures 
and the vested interests of incumbent financial service providers shape not only 
the further development of the practice but also that of the law, regardless of 
efficiency, legal certainty and international compatibility. Thus, law and practice 
have become inextricably intertwined per country, where the law aligned with the 
operations of national central securities depositories, settlement architectures and 
customer account agreements.46  
 As a consequence, whereas the legal rights vested in the investor and, 
respectively, in a security or collateral taker, had remained comparable after the 
first market movements towards transferability, they now diverged significantly 
between jurisdictions even though the same practice was used. The legal position 
of investors has since become characterised as anything between a bundle of 
insolvency-proof claims against the intermediary (‘security entitlement’, US and 
Canada), an equitable interest either in securities or in an equitable interest in 
securities (England), full and unshared property in electronic bearer securities 
(France), full and unshared property in direct rights (Nordic countries, China), or 
shared or common property in a pool of chattels (Germany).47  
The fact that national laws had become so idiosyncratic, complex and 
sometimes inconsistent in themselves had no significant consequences while 
securities markets remained mainly domestic. However, the third move towards 
more liquidity, notably the abolition of capital controls in many countries and the 
introduction of the EU single market, rendered the financial market truly 
international—and from that moment on, the discrepancies between the various 
approaches became relevant. 
 
C. Cross-border use of securities, universal fungibility and PRIMA 
 
Jurisdictions had barely digested, from the legal viewpoint, the emergence of 
intermediation when the third development began to gather pace. Since the 
disappearance of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, globalisation and the 
abolition of capital controls made available a huge asset reservoir. Markets began 
to use assets globally, for investment purposes, and, more importantly in the 
present context, to collateralise payment obligations, notably in derivative and 
                                                 
41 See L Afrell and K Wallin-Norman, ‘Direct or Indirect Holdings – A Nordic Perspective’ (2005) 
10(NS) Uniform Law Review, 277-284. 
42 See W Liang, ‘The Geneva Securities Convention and its Relevance for China’ (2012) Law and 
Financial Markets Review, 287-289. 
43 See Nizard (n 7), 245-52. 
44 Einsele (n 27), 64-160.  
45 See Benjamin, (n 11), 3-59; Financial Markets Law Committee, ‘Property Interests in Investment 
Securities’ (July 2004), available http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/3e.pdf, last accessed 
20.05.2016. Overview of relevant recent case law: Mr Justice Briggs, ‘Has English Law Coped with the 
Lehman Collapse?’ (2013) Butterworth Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 131-132.   
46 See E Micheler, ‘Custody chains and asset values: why crypto-securities are worth contemplating?’ 
Cambridge Law Journal (2015), 509-513. 
47 See references in n 39-45. 
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securities financing contracts. Cross-border investment and collateralisation had, 
of course, always existed. However, now the share of transactions with a cross-
jurisdictional element rose to 40% or more.48  
 While market practice changed towards the international use of securities, 
parties were unable consistently to overcome the legal obstacles associated with 
this practice, in particular requirements under mandatory property and insolvency 
laws and consequences stemming from the relevant rules of private international 
law. As a consequence, the market either transacted under legally uncertain 
conditions (thereby driving up transaction cost) or had to abstain from certain 
transactions altogether (provoking opportunity cost)—an argument that has now 
been taken up again by the Commission in the context of the Capital Markets 
Union.49 
1. Lex rei sitae, lex societatis and PRIMA 
Guynn50 was the first to conceptualise the relevant shortcomings of the private 
international law. He argued that the place of the securities certificate (lex rei sitae) 
and the place of the incorporation of the securities issuer (lex societatis) as 
connecting factors for bearer and registered securities, respectively,51 were 
unsuitable to yield a consistent result in the intermediated set-up of securities 
markets, let alone in the cross-jurisdictional context. Central banks, which 
regularly take foreign securities as collateral in exchange for liquidity they provide 
to commercial banks, developed a strong interest in this argument. As a 
consequence, legislators in Europe as well as at the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law rushed to address this concern by introducing a new type of 
conflict-of-laws rule, based on a novel connecting factor called ‘place of the 
relevant intermediary approach’ or PRIMA. It was designed to facilitate the cross-
jurisdictional use of securities, thereby lowering transaction and opportunity 
cost.52  
                                                 
48 Data shows that between 5 per cent and 95 per cent of investments in the different European financial 
centres are allocated to cross-border securities; typically, in large financial centres like London, Frankfurt 
and Paris, between 30 per cent and 70 per cent are allocated to cross-border holdings. The share of cross-
border holdings is mirrored by a correspondent percentage of cross-border trading activity. (Data extracted 
from Oxera, ‘Monitoring prices, cost and volumes of trading and post-trading services’, Report prepared 
for the European Commission, London and Brussels (2011), 73. Though the data itself relates to equity 
investments, the authors note, ibid., that they have found a positive correlation between equity and debt 
securities in respect of cross-border holdings.) No data is available indicating the percentage of securities 
collateral provided across borders but, going by the aforementioned figures, a significant percentage may 
be assumed. It is probably justified, therefore, for ease of reference, to collapse these three elements into 
the figure of 40 per cent of all holding, trading and collateral operations by EU market participants in one 
way or another imply a cross-jurisdictional element. 
49 See n 4 and n 6. 
50 RD Guynn, ‘Modernizing Securities Ownership’ in Transfer and Pledging Laws, International Bar 
Association (ed) 1996, 5-12; see also Ooi, ‘The Choice of a Choice of Law Rule’, in Louise Gullifer and 
Jennifer Payne (eds.), Intermediated Securities. Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2010) 219–244. 
51 See Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed. (2012) Vol. 2, 22-40 and 22-44. 
52 See Benjamin, (n 11), 158-159; C Bernasconi, ‘The law applicable to dispositions of securities held 
through indirect holding systems’, Hague Conference on Private international Law, Collateral Securities 
Prel. Doc. 1 (November 2000). In Europe, the new rule was introduces through three sectoral Directives: 
Article 9(1) Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on 
financial collateral arrangements, Article 9(2) Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems; Article 24 
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2. The factual and contractual variations of PRIMA 
PRIMA departs from the traditional connecting factors referring to location or 
incorporation. Instead, it refers to the law of the securities account to which the 
relevant securities are credited.53 This law governs all securities credited to this 
account, whether foreign or domestic. The new approach subsumes two different 
sub-species: in relation to what might be termed the Factual PRIMA, the law of the 
account is the law of the place where the account is factually maintained. This 
subcategory is, roughly, the approach taken by the relevant EU legislation.54 In 
relation to what might be termed the Contractual PRIMA, the law of the account is 
the law agreed upon to this effect by the parties. This is the approach underlying 
the Hague Securities Convention55, which is also the law in Switzerland.56  
The merits of both approaches have been hotly debated.57 On the one hand, 
the Factual PRIMA may cause uncertainty because it is not always clear where an 
account is located where a multinational intermediary it is involved. On the other 
hand, the Contractual PRIMA was perceived as politically unacceptable because it 
would allow parties to provide collateral under English or New York law 
regardless of where they were located themselves, thus circumventing national 
mandatory property and insolvency laws. Both arguments have their merits, but 
what matters more in the present context is that both follow the same basic logic: 
the law applicable to securities disposition and acquisition is determined on an inter 
partes basis, i.e. the two-party relationship between account holder and 
intermediary, whereas before, lex rei sitae and lex societatis had been absolute, 
inflexible connecting factors.  
3. Financial collateral and universal fungibility 
This change of approach from an absolute to a relational connecting factor helped 
in accommodating two important market practices: the collateralisation of entire 
accounts and the inclusion of the value of the collateral assets in contractual 
insolvency set-off, often also called close-out netting. Both are extremely 
beneficial from an efficiency perspective and securities financing and derivatives 
transactions rely heavily on these techniques. 
The principal efficiency gain flows from the fact that PRIMA allows entire 
accounts to be used as collateral, even if they contain securities from various 
jurisdictions. Otherwise, for instance, a portfolio comprising French, Japanese and 
                                                                                                                            
Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 April 2001 on the 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions. 
53 Ooi, (n 50), 221.  
54 See the Directives cited in n 52. 
55 Hague Securities Convention (n 2), Articles 2(1) and 4(1). The choice is restricted on the basis of a 
requirement that the intermediary has a qualifying establishment in the country the law of which has been 
chosen.  
56 Federal Intermediated Securities Act (Switzerland), Article 108c. See H Kuhn, B Graham-Siegenthaler, 
L Thévenoz, The Federal Intermediated Securities Act and the Hague Securities Convention, Stämpfli, Berne (2010), 
1-7. 
57 P Bloch and H de Vauplane, ‘Loi applicable et critères de localisation des titres multi-intermédiés dans la Convention 
de La Haye’, (2005) Journal du droit international – Clunet, 3–40 ; D Einsele, ‘Das Haager Übereinkommen 
über das auf bestimmte Rechte im Zusammenhang mit zwischenverwahrten Wertpapieren anzuwendende Recht’ (2003) 
WM – Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht, 2349–2356 ; Ooi, n 50; Sigman, Harry C. and 
Bernasconi, Christophe, ‘Myths about the Hague Convention debunked’ (2005) International Finance 
Law Review, 31–35. 
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Delaware securities could never be collateralised as a whole unless the collateral 
was made enforceable under the three jurisdictions, which is cumbersome and not 
always possible.58 Further, PRIMA is particularly important because parties rely on 
the possibility to change the collateral portfolio during the course of the 
transaction, either to adjust its value to the changing value of the underlying 
obligation by adding or subtracting securities (‘margining’) or to exchange, during 
the course of the arrangement, one kind of security for another, in accordance 
with their business needs (‘substitution’).59 This happens often on a daily basis. It 
would be cumbersome and legally uncertain to accommodate a change in the 
applicable law whenever a new kind of security is added, say, in the above 
example, when German securities are substituted for French ones. With PRIMA, 
the law applicable to the securities remains unchanged because it applies to the 
entire account and its—changing—content. 
Secondly, parties seek to align the law governing their financial collateral with 
the law governing their contractual relationships, say, a derivative or securities 
financing transaction, which are typically concluded under English law.60 The 
relevant standard documentation by default contains clauses allowing for 
insolvency set-off or close-out netting. 61 It is considerably easier to arrange for the 
value of the collateral portfolio to be included in this calculation if the applicable 
law can be clearly identified and—ideally—can be chosen by the parties. This is 
why the difference between factual and contractual PRIMA is so relevant. 
Thus, the introduction of PRIMA made it possible to apply the techniques of 
margining, substitution and insolvency set-off, thereby contributing significantly to 
improved enforceability of such arrangements, allowing for quasi-universal 
fungibility covering securities of any kind. Their only relevant feature was, from 
now on, their value.   
III. Absolute and Relational Rights and the Role of 
Intermediaries 
The preceding part has shown how three major developments in the practice of 
holding and transferring securities have supported the increase of liquidity in 
securities markets, notably transferability, intermediation and cross-jurisdictional 
use of securities. Every move towards a new practice was subsequently sanctioned 
by legislators and the courts. However, idiosyncratic national legal approaches 
resulted in an uncoordinated and heterogeneous legal framework, while PRIMA 
introduced an inter partes perspective into an area of the law where, in most 
jurisdictions, rights are absolute, at least in principle.  
 Recent attempts to harmonise national laws in this regard, i.e. the Geneva 
Securities Convention and the EU Clearing and Settlement Legal Certainty 
Project, have failed.62 At first glance, this is surprising, since the drafters 
                                                 
58 R Goode, et al, Explanatory Report to the Hague Securities Convention, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2005), 
18. 
59 See P Paech, ‘The Value of Insolvency Safe Harbours’, forthcoming in the Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies (2016), Section 2, online version doi:10.1093/ojls/gqv041. 
60 See Global Master Repurchase Agreement, Article 17; ISDA Master Agreement, Schedule Part 4 (h). 
61 See Global Master Repurchase Agreement, Article 10; ISDA Master Agreement, Article 6. 
62 See n 2, 3. 
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concentrated on achieving a high degree of functionality and conceptual neutrality 
so that not only could national laws continue to apply but indeed could largely 
remain unchanged.63 However, the resulting rules became so neutral in conceptual 
terms that they seem to suggest that any type of right, including absolute rights 
such as direct property, might be held in the intermediated system.64 That, 
however, appears to be contrary to certain practical features of indirect holding 
systems which suggest that only relational rights can exist in them. Not 
surprisingly, as a consequence, the fundamental uncertainty whether the idea of an 
erga omnes right is at all compatible with intermediated securities holding remained 
and will continue to inhibit progress in terms of harmonisation.  
 Two types of legal framework mark clear positions in this discussion.65 First, 
there is the framework epitomised by U.C.C. Article 8, where the legal solution is 
modelled to fit the intermediated holding system. It is built on multi-tier relational 
rights between the parties to securities accounts. There are no legal relationships 
beyond that account relationship; in particular, there are no direct rights against 
the issuer or any intermediaries other than an account holder’s direct intermediary. 
The second type of legal framework is built on the contrary understanding. It is 
used in the Nordic countries and elsewhere. Here, investors have an identifiable, 
direct legal relationship with the issuer and intermediaries take no legal positions in 
the securitieswhatsoever. The holding system is not built on pooled accounts and 
does not mirror each security several times in various accounts. Instead, there is 
only one central ledger maintained in the central securities depository, which can 
be changed by banks and brokers as agents.66 Both approaches are clear and 
consistent in terms of the right that an account holder receives. 
 A confusing position is taken by those jurisdictions that practise the former 
but conceptually think in terms of the latter holding system, such as France and 
Germany. These jurisdictions use multi-tiered holding systems as in the US 
market, involving pooled accounts and mirroring each security several times 
throughout the system. At the same time, these jurisdictions assume the existence 
of an erga omnes right, 67 as exists under the Nordic approach. However, the indirect 
holding system does not provide for a set-up in which erga omnes positions are 
viable, and it is impossible for the law to impose it. Rather, the intermediated 
holding system is inextricably linked to a relational understanding of the rights 
they confer on account holders, as the following sections will show. 
A. Client asset protection 
Originally, paper certificates and register entries were effective carriers of the right 
and plausible vehicles for easy and safe acquisition and disposition.68 However, 
these approaches struggled to produce consistent results as soon as the market 
moved on to intermediated holding. The latter boosted liquidity but came at the 
                                                 
63 Geneva Securities Convention (n 2), Preamble, Recital 6; EU Clearing and Settlement Legal Certainty 
Group (n 3), 4.3. 
64 See Geneva Securities Convention (n 2), Article 9; Clearing and Settlement Legal Certainty Group 
(n 3), Recommendation 4. 
65 See n 39-45 and accompanying text. 
66 See Unidroit, Study S78 – Doc 44 (n 32). 
67 See Einsele (n 27), 13, Nizard (n 7), 294. 
68 Nizard (n 7), 224. 
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price of novel risks caused by intermediation, such as inadvertent or deliberate 
misappropriation of securities, or the creation of credit entries in client accounts 
that were not backed by the intermediary’s own holdings. Such practices typically 
result in losses of client securities in the event of an intermediary’s insolvency 
(‘intermediary risk’).  
 However, strikingly, the classification of securities as property rights has never 
been capable of addressing intermediary risk, even though property is generally 
associated with the highest possible degree of safety. The reason is that the 
classification as property, notably of bearer securities, was originally conceived to 
serve a different function, that of transferability, through vehicles such as 
negotiation and good faith acquisition. This transfer function was and is still 
needed and became even more essential in the intermediated world, as no acquirer 
in the anonymous environment of automated exchanges and centralised clearing 
and settlement would be able to verify whether the right itself or the acquisition 
process were free of any legal defects.69  
 However, transferability comes at the price of increased intermediary risk 
because it ‘validates’ deliberate or inadvertent misappropriation of securities and 
the creation of ‘excess rights’ by intermediaries.70 The risk associated with this 
kind of non-compliance on the intermediary’s side is typically borne by the original 
owner who would lose out if a third person acquired the right from the 
intermediary in good faith. This was a real risk even before modern clearing and 
settlement systems emerged and investors dealt with their banks or brokers on a 
much more personal basis: once security certificates were physically delivered into 
custody, the investor had no choice but to trust its custodian that it would comply 
with segregation requirements to keep the property identifiable, and that it would, 
at the same time, abstain from unauthorised dealings in the securities. If the 
custodian breached these obligations, the original owner was always at risk of 
losing the securities. Thus, with the advent of intermediation, from the perspective 
of account holders, negotiability and good faith acquisition have become both a 
boon and a bane. 
In practice, it is behavioural obligations that protect securities holdings.71 
Regulatory regimes such as the famous MiFID (EU) or CASS (UK) rules72 impose 
duties on intermediaries designed to make mistakes or fraud less likely. This 
approach is anything but new. The first German law on indirect holding of 1896 
recognised the practice of pooling and multi-tier holding and addressed the 
investor’s resulting weak position by imposing segregation duties on the bank or 
broker, on threat of payment of a 3000 Deutschmark fine or up to two years’ 
imprisonment for non-compliance.73 However, the mere classification of securities 
as a property right with an erga omnes character could not achieve the desired level 
of investor protection either then or today. 
                                                 
69 Nizard (n 7), 253-257. 
70 See Nizard (n 7), 225. 
71 See Mooney, (n 14), 324-29. 
72 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Markets in 
Financial Instruments [etc.]; Financial Conduct Authority, Handbook, Client Assets, Custody Rules 
(‘CASS6’). 
73 Gesetz betreffend die Pflichten der Kaufleute bei Aufbewahrung fremder Werthpapier (1896), 
https://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Gesetz,_betreffend_die_Pflichten_der_Kaufleute_bei_Aufbewahrung_fr
emder_Werthpapiere last accessed  20.05.2016. See also Mooney, (n 14), 402-3. 
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B.  Investor rights 
A second issue is the tension between property in a security, on the one hand, and 
the ability to exercise the rights flowing from that security, on the other. In 
practice, investors are often excluded from these rights.74 For instance, they may 
find themselves in a situation where they are not invited to attend and vote in the 
annual general meeting because they are not recognised as shareholders in legal 
terms.75 The root of the problem is that the connection between issuer and 
investor is interrupted as a consequence of the intermediated holding system, 
either because the legal bond between the two is broken by the holding pattern, or 
because operational hurdles inhibit the exercise of the rights, or both.76  
 Again, the idea of property as a specific and absolute right adds to the 
confusion rather than helping to sort it out, especially in cross-border situations. 
This is primarily because substantive securities law may attribute legal title to a 
person who is therefore considered a shareholder or bondholder but who is not 
the person taking the risk of the investment in economic terms. In the UK and the 
US, the holder of legal title is typically the topmost intermediary or its nominee. In 
France, Germany and many other jurisdictions the property is supposed to lie with 
the ultimate investor. In international settings, where different laws might apply to 
the various accounts of a holding chain, these laws, independently from each 
other, may even identify more than one legal owner of what is the same security in 
economic terms.77 This sounds like a quirk of nature but in fact arises from the 
modern intermediated market structure supported by the introduction of PRIMA: 
to the extent that the question of who owns what is answered independently for 
each account of an intermediated holding chain there may theoretically be as many 
conflicting answers as there are accounts. 
 Even if the investor is properly identified as shareholder or bondholder, the 
chain of intermediaries stands between it and the issuer. As every member of the 
chain only knows who is next in line, communication regarding corporate rights is 
operationally complicated, cumbersome and costly and, therefore, often does not 
work. 
In this set-up, again, whether or not investors are able to exercise their rights 
often depends on the compliance of intermediaries with behavioural obligations. 
This might or might not work smoothly in national systems, and it certainly does 
not work in the international context.78 However, the classification of securities as 
a property right per se is of no help in this regard.  
                                                 
74 See J Payne, ‘Intermediated Securities and the Right to Vote in the UK’ in L Gullifer and J Payne (eds), 
Intermediated Securities, Hart, Oxford and Portland 2010, 187-218; Micheler (n 50). 
75 The problem exists in respect of all sorts of corporate rights in the context of distributions, 
reorganisation and general meetings. Dividend or coupon payments may be the only right flowing from a 
security that reliably reaches the investor. See, for instance, the relevant work of an ECB working group 
on Corporate Actions, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/t2s/governance/ag/html/subcorpact/index.en.html. 
76 See Micheler (n 50), 509-513.  
77 See P Paech, ‘Market Needs as Paradigm’ in PH Conac, U Segna and L Thévenoz (eds), Intermediated 
Securities, Cambridge University Press 2013, 36-38. 
78 See Micheler (n 32); see also the industry-wide ‘Market standards for corporate action processing’ 
which lay down very basic principles on how intermediaries should handle investor rights in a cross-
border context, available at www.afme.eu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9152, accessed on 
20.5.2016. 
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C.  The Structure of Duties 
Erga omnes is a term typically used to distinguish absolute from relational rights, in 
particular to describe the difference between property rights and obligations. The 
exact nature of property as an erga omnes right is still controversial but it generally 
hovers around the elements of ‘right to exclude’ and ‘right to use’.79 An investor in 
securities at present appears to have none of these; therefore, it is unlikely that 
securities can be classified as property.80 
As far as the right to exclude is concerned, it refers to a duty owed by the rest 
of the world to the proprietor to abstain from deliberate or careless interference 
with the right,81 without any special permission, in particular from converting the 
right, or trespassing it, or damaging it.82 Transposing these ideas to modern 
securities holding, the picture seems quite straightforward at first glance: a holder 
of a security typically aims to exclude the whole world: the intermediaries involved 
in the holding from enjoying rights flowing from the securities and using them 
economically; the creditors of these intermediaries from accessing the securities in 
the event of insolvency; and other parties in general from using the securities for 
their own economic purposes. However, if we turn this around and ask who owes 
the duty not to interfere, the picture is more confusing. The focal point is the role 
of intermediaries alone—only they owe duties as only they have and can give 
access to the securities. Others can have access only through them, typically on the 
basis of a court or regulatory order. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether 
duties are owed by ‘the whole world’. 
A more fundamental point is the question of who owes these duties to whom. 
In a typical holding situation, a number of intermediaries are involved in holding 
the same economic asset. Only the investor’s direct intermediary owes the duties to 
it.83 Any other intermediary would typically owe duties to its own account holders, 
and would be unable to identify the ultimate investor. In other words, in asking 
who owes duties to whom, there would appear to be as many identical, stacked 
positions as there are accounts involved in the holding chain. The investor would 
appear not to have an erga omnes right against the whole world but rather a right 
against its direct intermediary which, in turn, is in an identical position against its 
own direct intermediary, and so on. 
A second trait of property is that the proprietor can do with the asset 
whatever it pleases: use it, abandon it, do nothing at all with it, and enjoy its 
fruits.84 However, the ultimate investor’s right will typically only be enforceable 
against its direct intermediary but not against any other intermediaries involved in 
holding its securities: for lack of specificity and the ability to identify the ultimate 
investor’s assets, they would all be unable to comply with its claim.85 
Consequently, the proprietor’s freedom to do whatever it felt like with the security 
                                                 
79 See S Douglas and B McFarlane, ‘Defining Property Rights’, in J Penner and HE Smith, Philosophical 
Foundations of Property Law, Oxford University Press (2013) 219.  
80 See Mooney, (n 14), 412; Nizard (n 7), 305. 
81 Douglas and B McFarlane (n 79), 220. 
82 Ibid, 224. 
83 See Benjamin, Interest in Securities (n 11), 155. 
84 Douglas and McFarlane, (n 79), 226. 
85 Nizard (n 7), 412; See Article 22 of the Geneva Securities Convention, which expressly excludes access 
to the investor’s securities at the level of any intermediary other than the direct intermediary. 
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is restricted to exactly one option apart from just holding it: it can instruct its 
intermediary to transfer it elsewhere. 
D. Conflict of laws and the broken bond between issuer and investor 
In terms of conflict of laws, a similar development may be observed from the 
absolute to the relational perspective, contributing further to an understanding of 
intermediated securities as inter partes rights, thereby making intermediaries’ duties 
the focal point of the legal framework.  
Traditional approaches to conflict of laws in respect of securities incorporated 
the idea that there exists a fixed number of rights (the securities) between the 
issuer and its investors. For example, an issuer has issued 1m securities, and at no 
point in time can there ever be more or less than 1m securities. Lex rei sitae (for 
bearer securities) ensured that only the law of the situs of the certificate applied to 
proprietary questions such as acquisition and encumbrance, but no other law. Lex 
societatis (for registered securities), inversely, resulted in a situation where the 
location of parties and any evidencing documentation was irrelevant and only the 
law of the issuer applied.86 
Therefore, conflicts between different laws as to the enforceability of rights in 
securities did not arise simply because the securities existed in only one place, 
either as a certificate or as a register entry. Thus, it was impossible for the 
acquisition of a security to be valid under one law but invalid under another. Both 
systems were closed within themselves and therefore consistently able to settle 
questions as to which party stood to lose and which party would win, for instance 
in the scenario of good faith acquisition.87 The concept of erga omnes fits snugly 
into that environment.  
By contrast, the introduction of PRIMA led to a situation in which the law 
applicable to a security is determined on the basis of an inter partes relationship. 
Different laws may govern the various accounts through which a security is held. 
This has two consequences. First, the right of the investor might be governed by 
one law, whereas the right in the securities certificate or register entry might be 
governed by another law—hence, the two economic positions are legally 
unconnected. Secondly, the different laws that apply to the various accounts in a 
holding chain may create enforceable rights that are in unresolvable conflict. For 
instance, the end investor may have an unencumbered property right, whereas an 
intermediary at a different level has validly pledged an account to its creditor that 
comprises the relevant security. Both aspects clearly point to the result that 
different assets exist in the different accounts in a securities holding chain.   
The certificate and register systems guaranteed both horizontal transferability 
between market participants and vertical consistency between the rights originally 
issued by the issuer and those in the hands of investors. With the move to 
                                                 
86 The majority view is that lex societatis applies in case of registered shares, see M Ooi, Shares and other 
Securities in the Conflict of Laws, Oxford University Press 2003, mainly referring to the Court of Appeal 
decision [1996] 1 WLR 387 Macmillan. Lex rei sitae applies in case of bearer shares, where there are two 
scenarios: for those bearer shares in central custody that place would determine the law. For those bearer 
shares outside central custody, the law the jurisdiction of the location of the certificate applies.  
87 P Paech, ‘Intermediated Securities and Conflict of Laws’, conference paper (May 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2451030, last accessed 20.05.2016. 
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intermediation and PRIMA, this equilibrium shifted towards the horizontal, 
transactional environment,88 in which intermediaries play the pivotal role.  
IV. From Intermediated Securities to Blockchain Settlement 
 Professor Mooney wrote in 1990 with regard to the U.C.C. that ‘intermediary 
solvency and integrity [is] at the heart of the treatment’ for improved client asset 
protection in intermediated systems.89 The preceding sections show that this is still 
true twenty-five years on, and on a global scale. Recent insolvencies of financial 
intermediaries, in particular Lehman Bros., Madoff and MF Global, confirm that, 
while solvency and integrity requirements generally enhance investor protection 
and stability, they cannot protect securities holders against intermediary risk. The 
benefits of the current intermediated system in terms of liquidity are considerable 
but the system still appears flawed in terms of legal certainty and overall 
consistency.  
 However, it is not written in stone that liquidity and legal consistency are 
mutually exclusive. As an alternative new solution, models of un-intermediated 
holding, acquisition and disposition of securities have recently appeared on the 
agenda. Notably, the use of distributed ledger, or blockchain, technology beyond 
Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies is seen as a way better to consolidate the aims 
of liquidity and legal certainty than is currently possible in the intermediated 
system.90 Details of such plans are not publicly available, although it is clear that 
important market players invest resources in exploring the potential benefits of 
that idea, notably increased speed of settlement at lower cost.91 At the moment, 
nobody contemplates the immediate introduction of crypto-securities for the 
market as a whole. Rather, the industry seems to plan using the technology for 
specific parts of the market and specific functions, while crypto-securities might 
be issued first in niche markets and probably later occur in relation to mainstream 
financial instruments such as shares in real economy corporations.92 The close 
conceptual kinship with Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies suggests that crypto-
securities may also become available to individual, even retail, investors. 
 With blockchain, Professor Mooney’s prediction that ‘innovations in 
technology and settlement systems might increase direct relationships between 
                                                 
88 Paech, ibid. 
89 Mooney, (n 14), 413. 
90 See R Ali, J Barrdear, R Clews & J Southable, ‘Innovations in Payment Technologies and the 
Emergence of Digital Currencies’ Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q3, available 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2499397, last accessed  20.05.2016; Wright and De 
Filippi, ‘Decentralised Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographica’ (2015) Working paper, 
11-12, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664, last accessed 
20.05.2016; M Kalderon, F Snagg and C Harrop, ‘Distributed ledgers: a future in financial services?’, 
(2016) JIBLR 31-5, 243. 
91 GW Peters and E Panayi, ‘Understanding Modern Banking Ledgers through Blockchain Technologies: 
Future of Transaction Processing and Smart Contracts on the Internet of Money, Working Paper 
(18.11.2015), 26-27, 30, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692487, last 
accessed 15.4.2016. 
92 See, for instance, Cade Metz, ‘SEC approves plan to issue stock via Bitcoin’s blockchain’ (press release 
15.12.2015), available at http://www.wired.com/2015/12/sec-approves-plan-to-issue-company-stock-
via-the-bitcoin-blockchain/, last accessed on 20.5.2015.  
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market participants and issuers and permit less reliance on intermediary control’93 
now seems to be coming true. However, that long-term shift will fundamentally 
change the parameters on which the current legal and regulatory framework is 
built, notably because the intermediary function, which currently serves as a 
linchpin for law and regulation, will not be part of the blockchain environment. 
  
A. Holding and transfer of crypto-securities 
Blockchain, or distributed ledger technology is able to attribute an asset to a user 
without the need for intermediation. ‘Something’ is represented by a unique piece 
of code and stored in an electronic vault that belongs to a market participant. The 
value of this piece of code can be freely determined. It could be a unit of a virtual 
currency, like Bitcoin, or it could be a unit in a securities issue, or something 
entirely unrelated to finance, like entitlements to obtain healthcare.94 For the unit 
to be transferred, the transferor and the transferee connect through the Internet 
and the system’s software effects an accrual and diminution of units in their 
electronic vaults.  
 With the lack of physical tokens, such as coins, bills or bearer certificates, 
there would in principle be room for error and manipulation: for instance, selling 
the same piece of code twice. In traditional token-less systems, such as payment 
systems, the problem of correct allocation of rights can only be asssured by a 
central entity that acts as bookkeeper for all participants. Such a central entity is 
not needed for assets transferred using blockchain, as a public verification process 
which involves many or even all participants ensures that there is no double-
spending or other friction. All participants have access to this information and all 
accounts are regularly and automatically consolidated through the Internet. 
 Second-generation blockchain applications have potential beyond the mere 
exchange and attribution of rights. Here, the piece of code contains ‘smart’ 
elements that are able automatically to trigger performance if a specified event 
occurs,95 such as the payment of dividends, or the enforcement of rights, or 
automatic termination, realisation of collateral or netting. Multiple smart contracts 
can even be bound together to form a decentralised structure that operates 
according to their code with no human interaction.96 
B. Does Blockchain settlement need securities law? 
Blockchain technology raises a number of regulatory and legal issues. The focus 
has so far been on illicit practices, such as money laundering and terrorist 
financing through Bitcoin.97 There are also wider questions such as whether 
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societies in the blockchain era will still be able to regulate commercial activity by 
means of the law.98 The commercial, insolvency and securities law framework for 
crypto-securities and securities holding through blockchain has so far only 
received scant attention.99 However, societies should consider carefully to what 
extent they wish to allow algorithms to replace judicial law enforcement.100 In the 
transactional context, parties may be given the option to choose a conflict 
settlement mechanism with direct enforcement that is built into the system.101 In 
the non-transactional context, the attribution of crypto-securities to market 
participants will need to depend on their enforceability in court. These are notably 
cases in which third party interests are affected, such as the interests of unsecured 
creditors in insolvency. And, lastly, even purportedly fail-proof mechanisms can be 
manipulated102 and misused. As a consequence, a sound financial law framework 
for crypto-securities is indispensable. 
 Wright and De Filippi have shown that Nation States’ ability to regulate 
decentralised global systems is in any case fragile and, once lost, can only be 
regained with brute regulatory force, entailing ‘draconian’ limitations to the 
freedom of the markets.103 It is therefore crucial that a framework ensuring 
enforceability of blockchain securities settlement be developed at an early stage. If 
the law fails to provide consistent solutions to enforceability questions, markets 
will rely exclusively on operational structures and technical processes to make up 
for that gap. Users will push for self-regulation and the implementation of stateless 
mechanisms of adjudication which transcend the constraints of financial 
institutions and State regulation.104 The situation of the current global 
intermediated system and its patchy legal framework is a reminder of how financial 
law can end up in such a conundrum of legal, economic and operational path 
dependency from which there is no easy way out. Therefore, a globally consistent 
framework is needed not only as a matter of legal certainty, but also in order to 
maintain Nation States’ regulatory and legal grip on a market development that 
might become the infrastructure for the lifeblood of our economies. 
C. The intermediated and the crypto-environment 
Blockchain technology will first serve specific segments. Even though the 
technology has the potential to create a system entirely free of intermediation,105 
we will see a patchwork emerging with bits of the new blockchain set up side by 
                                                 
98 Wright and De Filippi  (n 90), especially 51-56.  
99 See JL Schroeder, ‘Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code’ Cardozo Law Faculty Research Paper 
No. 458 (August 2015), available http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2649441, 
accessed  20.05.2016; D Quest, ‘Taking security over bitcoins and other virtual currency’, Corporate 
Rescue and Insolvency (2015), 261; P Ortonlani, ‘Self-enforcing Online Dispute Resolution’ (2015) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1-35, doi: 10.1093/ojls/gqv036; Kalderon et al. (n 90), 246.  
100 See Wright and De Filippi (n 90), 51-56. 
101 See Ortolani (n 91), 15, in relation to Bitcoin-settled contracts for the sale of goods.  
102 UK Government Chief Scientific Advisor (n 94), 22; see, in relation to the insolvency of a Bitcoin 
Exchange, I Kaminska, ‘Mt Gox and the mother of all short squeezes’, Financial Times 20.5.2016, 
available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/05/20/2162507/mt-gox-and-the-mother-of-all-short-
squeezes/, last accessed 20.5.2016. 
103 Wright and De Filippi (n 90), 50-56. 
104 See Ortolani (n 91), 20, in relation to Bitcoin. 
105 See Wright and De Filippi (n 90), 1; Schroeder (n 99), 3. 
 21 
side with the older intermediated system and probably even with the traditional 
paper or register-based set-up. Three scenarios can be distinguished. 
1. Native crypto-securities  
 In a first scenario, issuers decide to issue new securities directly as blockchain 
instruments. I call these instruments “native crypto-securities”. They would exist 
side by side with intermediated securities issues. The relevant legal framework 
would fundamentally differ and pure crypto-securities and intermediated securities 
cannot be confounded in legal terms.106 However, legal uncertainty may arise in 
the following two scenarios where the market creates intersections between these 
worlds. 
2. Trans-crypto-securities 
In a second scenario, the issuer moves a pre-existing securities issue fully or partly 
from the intermediated system to the blockchain environment. I call these 
products “trans-crypto-securities”. The situation here is quite comparable to when 
securities were first moved from the paper and register-based systems into the 
intermediated environment. The transformation needs interfaces in both 
operational and legal terms. Disregarding the operational side for the purpose of 
this paper, the legal interface will need to consist of a rule that has two functions: 
first to make the relevant transformed securities disappear entirely from the 
intermediated system; secondly, to bring the securities into circulation as crypto-
securities.107  
 Both disappearance and reappearance need to be legally enforceable, including 
in insolvency. The possibility for rights in transformed securities to continue to be 
enforced in the intermediated system must be excluded. During the 
transformational process from paper to intermediated securities, many 
jurisdictions struggled in this regard, keeping the former carrier of the right alive 
while depriving it of its function, for example by uselessly storing security 
certificates in a central depository, a strategy that has considerable potential to 
confuse legal analysis.108 As a consequence, there has always been a residual 
danger that unsecured creditors try to attach securities at the place of storage of 
the certificates or at the level of the issuer register, typically by means of court 
orders.109 
3. Intermediated crypto-securities  
In a third scenario, consortia of market players build ‘crypto-enclaves’ in an 
environment that is generally still intermediated. For instance, a group of banks 
may set up a settlement mechanism amongst them, using blockchain 
technology.110 However, the securities settled in this enclave are issued as 
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intermediated securities and have not undergone the transformation initiated by 
the issuer, as described before. Rather, participants in the settlement mechanism 
create ‘their own’ crypto-securities, which represent securities they themselves 
hold in the intermediated system. Here, the danger of mismatch or conflict is 
considerable, because the intermediated securities are what economically underpin 
the crypto securities. The parallel with the single most problematic trait of the 
current intermediated system is striking: different legal positions ultimately link to 
the same underlying asset, and the avoidance of conflict depends wholly on the 
compliance of the intermediary. If it fails to comply and becomes insolvent, the 
acquirers of its crypto-securities would be unprotected.  
D. The point of entry for the law 
 Under the current intermediated approach, the PRIMA rule determines how 
the question of enforceability of a right in securities is connected to the law of a 
specific State. However, PRIMA presupposes the existence of accounts and 
therefore of intermediaries, which will not exist as such in the blockchain set-up. 
Consequently, the point of entry for the law into the world of crypto-securities is 
still unclear.111 
1. The nature of the right and the applicable law  
At first glance, the nature of the right, i.e. whether crypto-securities are claims or 
some kind of property, seems to be at the core of the issue of enforceability. 
Considering the criteria applied in the context of intermediated securities,112 the 
most important communality is that both intermediated and crypto-securities 
represent a legal relationship between an investor and an issuer (in that, crypto-
securities differ markedly from bitcoins and other virtual currencies which do not 
represent a claim against an issuer). The most relevant difference between 
intermediated and crypto-securities is that the latter are not pooled or mirrored in 
the system. Each crypto-security remains unique and identifiable. Further, crypto-
securities directly embody the right, whereas intermediated securities in the 
investor’s account merely relate to some root entry or certificate that is located at 
the top of the holding system. Lastly, the electronic vault is the single point of 
access to a crypto-security, and the owner of the vault is the sole key-holder. In 
that respect, crypto-securities come extremely close to the traditional concept of 
bearer securities, with the difference that the content is not set out in writing on 
paper but in electronic code. Therefore, it would, in principle, make sense to 
classify them as some kind of property and determine the applicable law on the 
basis of territorial considerations: the nature of the right as well as the conditions 
for enforceable acquisition and disposition would be determined by the law of the 
place of the electronic vault, or by the place of the key-holder. 
 However, it is doubtful whether this approach will be any help, similar to what 
has been described in relation to intermediated securities. The reason is that any 
such conceptual thinking is confined to a purely domestic legal view. The financial 
market is global, as is the Internet, and crypto-securities can be transferred globally 
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across jurisdictional confines and without the need for physical infrastructures 
other than the Internet. However, that also means that rights in crypto-securities 
need to be enforceable in insolvency proceedings in basically any jurisdiction. The 
idiosyncratic classification of the right as property or any other type of right will 
not be able to provide for a legal position that will yield the desired result—
enforceability—in so many jurisdictions. Therefore, other avenues will need to be 
explored. 
 A second alternative is the application of the law of the issuer, lex societatis, to 
crypto-securities. The classification of the nature of the right is irrelevant in this 
case, and the identification of the applicable law would be very easy in relation to 
each securities issue. However, this approach leads to a situation where the 
holding of international portfolios in a user’s electronic vault requires the 
application of different laws to questions of acquisition, disposition and 
enforceability. In the intermediated environment just such a situation led to 
considerable legal uncertainty before PRIMA was introduced.113 In the blockchain 
environment, the application of different laws to a user’s portfolio would create 
the same uncertainty and ultimately undo much of the benefit of the new 
technology. 
 A better connecting factor for the law governing enforceability of rights is the 
software platform that holders of crypto-securities use. One might call that law ‘lex 
systematis’. It could be determined either on the basis of a uniform choice of the 
users of the relevant platform or, alternatively, it could be the law of the 
jurisdiction of the relevant supervisor. Blockchain platforms used for securities 
settlement need to be regulated and supervised for systemic stability and investor 
protection purposes. Regulation could, in principle, allow a choice of law for the 
platform and its users as a whole, or, alternatively, impose the applicable law. In 
order to guarantee enforceability of rights in crypto-securities, it is crucial that 
insolvency laws around the world recognise acquisitions and dispositions effected 
under this law. 
2. The mechanics between law and IT-based acquisition processes   
As there will be different blockchain systems that operate slightly differently, it will 
be difficult to design a legal framework that can penetrate the technology down to 
the smallest detail. Rules that provide for enforceability of rights in insolvency 
need to be stable and cannot be adapted to frequent technological changes. 
Therefore, the solution may consist in creating a mechanism under which the law 
refers to the platform rules on acquisition and disposition. If the requirements of 
these platform rules are met, acquisitions and dispositions are enforceable. This 
approach is already applied to another ‘black box’ in the financial market, i.e. the 
clearinghouses.114 As in the case of clearinghouses, enforceable acquisition and 
disposition of crypto-securities under the platform rules would require recognition 
of that specific blockchain securities platform by a public authority, notably the 
financial supervisor, which should also scrutinise the platform rules.115 
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 However, it would need to be made clear that despite the referral to the rules 
of the system, compliance with these rules would still be subject to judicial review. 
Even though blockchain is regarded as extremely resistant to operational error or 
fraud, and even though some versions of blockchain systems are built in such a 
way as to render transactions technically irreversible,116 the law should not be 
reduced to rubberstamping the outcome of an IT process. The law must retain 
ultimate authority over the enforceability of rights, in particular when it comes to 
insolvency law and other areas of mandatory law which affect third parties, as even 
in a near fail-safe system errors or fraud can never be entirely excluded. A strong 
‘good faith’ rule will probably be part of the legal framework, not necessarily 
protecting the immediate acquirer but certainly any onwards acquirer. 
 In order to underline that the acquisition of crypto-securities is subject to 
judicial review, these rules would also need to include mechanisms allowing for the 
reversal of transactions.117 Otherwise, effective judicial review could generally be 
countered with the argument that an erroneous or fraudulent transaction may 
indeed be traceable, while attempts to unwind that transaction would inevitably 
lead to a disruption of all transactions that have occurred subsequently on the 
assumption that the erroneous transaction was valid. Experience with the current 
intermediated system shows that the inability to reverse may be used as an 
argument to preclude attempts to subject to review acquisition processes that have 
occurred in the system. However, for systemic reasons, reversal must be limited to 
crypto-securities still held by the immediate acquirer—it cannot extend to an 
onwards acquirer as this would disrupt the confidence of the entire market in the 
enforceability of acquisition. 
V. Conclusion  
In the wake of the markets’ constant search for higher liquidity, the legal 
framework for securities holding, acquisition and disposition has shifted 
incrementally but fundamentally over time. Originally, when securities were still 
transferred in certificated or registered form, securities law used to be the 
overarching determinant defining the rights of holders and acquirers as well as 
their creditors. With the advent of intermediation, the legal framework became 
increasingly patchy and dysfunctional, and the conduct of intermediaries gained 
importance in respect of client asset protection. When, later on, cross-
jurisdictional transactions became mainstream, the results provided by the 
aggregate application of different idiosyncratic laws, on the basis of the PRIMA 
rule, became positively confusing, and trust in international securities transactions 
is now mainly built on tight regulation of intermediaries and on their solvency.  
 The reason for this retreat of the law is that the international, IT-oriented 
market practice provides an ideal environment for liquidity but is fundamentally 
disrupted as a legal environment. This disruption stems mainly from the fact that 
much of the legal thinking is based on the image of specific, identifiable erga omnes 
rights, whereas the market practice is in reality hostile to that type of asset. Reform 
efforts have so far been unable to remove that friction because current law and 
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practice have become heavily path-dependent and intimately linked with each 
other. 
 Now, blockchain technology is about to be introduced into the world of 
securities settlement, the relevant parameters will be reshuffled once again. First of 
all, intermediaries are in principle obsolete and are therefore not a suitable point of 
entry for the relevant laws and regulations. Secondly, the importance, complexity 
and convergence of the relevant IT-based processes will increase significantly. 
Thus, the function of software platforms will become the focal point of the 
blockchain securities environment. Thirdly, securities will again become specific, 
identifiable rights, very much comparable to the bearer instruments of the past.   
 Blockchain technology is based on an extremely fail-proof, complex technical 
set-up and the role of commercial law is still entirely undefined. Some might even 
be tempted by the idea to leave the resolution of conflicts between the different 
users of a software platform to the rules of that platform itself, as the intervention 
of State-made law might render the whole set-up less efficient from a market 
practice point of view. Still, a commercial law framework is indispensable. The 
significance of acquisitions and dispositions of securities using blockchain 
technology goes beyond the mere interests of acquirer and disposer as platform 
users. Unsecured creditors will have a crucial interest in the question of ‘who owns 
what’ in the event that either the acquirer or the disposer becomes insolvent. The 
answer must be given by the rules of commercial and insolvency law. Acquisitions 
and dispositions effected on securities settlement platforms based on blockchain 
technology therefore need to be subjected to the laws of States.  
 Legislators would be well advised to take an interest in the law and regulation 
underlying blockchain securities settlement at an early stage. The picture of the 
current global intermediated holding system is a reminder of how disintegrated 
market practice and law can become. Therefore, instead of being reactive (as they 
have been in the past), national legislators and international bodies should now 
take a proactive stance and contribute to the creation of an efficient and legally 
safe securities settlement environment. Early and determined regulatory and 
legislative involvement is also important, since only a legally safe environment will 
appeal to the mainstream parts of the financial industry. Regulated banks, 
investment firms and pension funds cannot afford to move significant securities 
holdings into an environment that may be technically sound but which is not safe 
from the legal and regulatory perspective. 
 Considering the life-cycle of the current intermediated holding system, which 
first appeared in the late 19th century, the introduction of blockchain in clearing 
and settlement appears a once-in-several-generations chance to develop the 
technical environment of securities settlement in harmony with the law. In that 
sense, it will be the common effort of legislators, regulators and the financial 
industry that will be able to unlock the full efficiency and liquidity gains of 
blockchain technology in securities settlement. 
 
